Barske's paper, also grounded in semasiology , provides a rich ethnographic account of how a traditional Okinawan dance called nuchibana was utilized for contemporary political purposes by a group called ‘Okinawan Hands for Peace.’
In semasiology , for example, a non-Cartesian concept of person is coupled with a new-realist, post-positivist philosophy of science.
This presumes Williams's concept of the ‘action sign’, and thus locates semasiology where it belongs at the forefront of anthropological theories of human embodiment.
Williams notes that semasiology as an anthropological viewpoint assumes that human action includes both spoken sign systems and action sign systems and that human action, in being agentic, is therefore not ‘behavior’.
In contrast, semasiology conceptualizes the signifying body and the spaces in which people move as specifically human; that is, as meaning-making practices specific to language-using creatures.
More specifically, I proceed from the perspective of semasiological theory, which accepts biology as a necessary ground for human agency but not as a deterministic mechanism that can account for human social behavior.
In spite of the above critical remarks, I do not wish to deny the value of both the onomasiological and the semasiological approaches in semantic studies.
Williams provided exactly this understanding in her semasiological concept of the ‘action sign’.
The notion of action signs in semasiological theory, for example, presupposes a view of human beings as meaning-making agents.
However, semasiological theory denies that the ‘real’ explanation of human behavior and its significance is to be found in, for example, genes, the adrenal system, or the brain.