‘Inhalt’ stands for content, but is meant here in the sense of cognitive content or meaning rather than stuff, of intension as opposed to extension.
They provide a vehicle for the imaginative extension and intension of space beyond and within the realist scale of the city.
On the other hand, two sentences have the same intension if they are logically equivalent, i.e., their equivalence is due to the semantic rules of the language.
Deacon would argue that initially words are acquired as indices and only later do they gain intensional properties once symbol-symbol relations are established.
All versions of externalism have in common that intensions don't determine extensions.
There are sentences which are neither extensional nor intensional ; for example, belief-sentences.
It is made up of concepts and knowledge primitives intensionally contained in it.
But there is what philosophers (at least this philosopher) think of as an extensional and an intensional way of describing our perceptions.
In the language of nominalism, the terms ‘black’ and ‘white’ purport to have mutually exclusive intensions and should therefore have mutually exclusive extensions, which they do not.
Logics which attempt to display the logical properties of intensional contexts are called intensional logics.